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Abstract 
Compulsive checking occurs in both physical and mental forms and is a common 
symptom of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Though there has been much recent attention 
devoted to research on physical checking, mental checking has been largely neglected. Previous 
research has reliably found that repeated physical checking reduces memory confidence, 
vividness and detail, while memory accuracy remains relatively unaffected. The current study 
examined memory accuracy and meta-memory in (n = 62) undergraduate students for both 
physical and mental checks after repeated physical or mental checking of a stove. We 
hypothesized that repeated physical checking would lead to reductions in meta-memory for 
previous physical checks and that repeated mental checking would lead to reductions in meta-
memory for previous mental checks. Results were consistent with hypotheses, in that checking in 
each modality led to significant decreases in all meta-memory variables for that modality but not 
the other. Results also showed that checking in each modality led to slight but significant 
declines in memory accuracy for that modality. Findings are discussed in terms of cognitive-
behavioural models of and treatments for compulsive checking in OCD.  
 
 
Keywords: compulsive checking; memory; confidence; OCD; mental compulsions; metamemory
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Don’t even think about checking: Mental checking causes memory distrust 
Checking is one of the most common compulsions in obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD), as 75% of those diagnosed with the disorder report checking or washing behaviour as 
their primary compulsion (Ball, Baer, & Otto, 1996; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). Although 
checking behaviour itself is quite normative (Muris, Merckelbach, & Clavan, 1997), when the 
time spent checking becomes excessive, it often leads to significant distress and interference with 
daily living (APA, 2000). Checking behaviour takes many forms, including physical checking 
(e.g., the object or situation is physically manipulated in order to determine its safety), visual 
checking (e.g., going back to look at the object and verifying that it is how one left it and/or how 
one might like it to be), reassurance seeking (e.g., “You saw me turn off the light, right?”), and 
mental checking (e.g., reviewing and/or evaluating the memory of a previous check in one’s 
mind to assess/determine whether or not it was carried out correctly; comparing the memory of a 
completed check to an imagined ideal check to assess/determine whether or not it meets a 
desired standard; etc.). Though all of the above forms of checking are prevalent in OCD, 
investigations of checking have almost exclusively centred on physical checking. 
Although a range of effective psychological treatments exists for compulsive checking in 
OCD, such as cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT), including approaches with a behavioural 
emphasis such as exposure and response prevention (ERP), and those with more of a cognitive 
emphasis (Radomsky, Shafran, Coughtrey & Rachman, in press; Wilhelm & Steketee, 2006), 
they still leave a substantial proportion of people unwell. A study comparing the efficacy of 
pharmacotherapy to ERP found that although ERP was more efficacious than pharmacotherapy, 
and the combination of the two was the best treatment, 30% of patients still did not respond to 
treatment (Foa et al., 2005). Newer research showed that combining ERP and pharmacotherapy 
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was effective at reducing symptoms, but not to a clinically significant level (Simpson et al., 
2008). Investigations comparing CBT with ERP have found similar results. While both 
treatments were similarly efficacious,  at post-treatment 33% of patients did not respond to CBT, 
and 41% of patients did not respond to ERP (Whittal et al., 2004); at a two-year follow-up, 50% 
of the patients had relapsed (Whittal et al., 2008). 
Another possible reason why current psychological treatments may not be performing 
optimally could be that the models on which they are based are too broad (Rachman, 2002). A 
recent cognitive model of checking (Rachman, 2002) has been proposed to better explain, and by 
extension treat, this prevalent compulsion. Rachman proposes three cognitive multipliers which 
interact to increase and/or initiate checking behaviour: increased responsibility to prevent harm, 
increased probability of harm occurring, and increased severity of the potential harm. The 
checking continues thanks to a self-perpetuating mechanism whereby individuals check to 
become more certain; but in fact, the more individuals check, the less certain they become, and 
so the need to check is perpetuated (Rachman, 2002). This theory has now gained much 
empirical support, with a number of studies showing that the self-perpetuating mechanism does 
seem to operate as proposed (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a; 2003b; 2004; Radomsky, Gilchrist, 
& Dussault, 2006; Coles, Radomsky, & Horng, 2006).  As such, it would seem that low memory 
confidence, rather than a memory deficit, is the key feature in this mechanism. (Some researchers 
had previously proposed that checking behaviour persists because those diagnosed with OCD 
have poorer memories, and therefore check because of failures or problems in memory (e.g., 
Tallis, 1997), but there is now increasing evidence that people with OCD can display superior 
memory for objects and situations related to their obsessions and compulsions, particularly under 
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ecologically valid conditions (e.g., Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky, Rachman, & 
Hammond, 2001; Coles & Heimberg, 2002).) 
 van den Hout and Kindt (2003a) asked a group of undergraduate students to repeatedly 
check a virtual stove on a computer, while another group engaged in repeated irrelevant checking 
of a virtual light bulb. Both before and after the series of repeated checks, there was a single 
virtual stove checking trial. Results showed that those participants who engaged in repeated 
relevant checking had significantly decreased memory confidence, vividness and detail for the 
last check (as compared to the pre-test meta-memory scores), whereas those participants who 
engaged in repeated irrelevant checking showed no significant decreases in any of these 
variables. Actual memory accuracy remained intact in both groups. These findings suggest that 
even nonclinical participants can be made to doubt their memory, simply by asking them to 
engage in repeated checking behaviour. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that people with 
OCD do not have memory impairments, although they may perceive them as such because as 
checking increases, trust in memory decreases.  
Repeated checking of real objects also leads to significant decreases in memory 
confidence (along with the other above-mentioned meta-memory variables) in undergraduate 
students (Radomsky et al., 2006). Using an experimental design similar to that of van den Hout 
and Kindt (2003), participants repeatedly turned on, off, and checked either a real working stove 
(relevant checking), or a real kitchen faucet (irrelevant checking). Before and after the repeated 
checking, participants completed one individual check of the stove. Results were consistent with 
previous research using a virtual stove (e.g., van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a, b), as participants 
who engaged in repeated relevant checking had decreased memory confidence when compared 
to those who engaged in repeated irrelevant checking (Radomsky et al., 2006). 
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Thus it would seem that meta-memory (memory confidence, vividness, and detail) 
decreases as a result of repeated checking, and may do so a result of memory shifting away from 
a distinct ‘remembering’, towards a more general ‘knowing’ that the event took place (Tulving, 
1985; van den Hout & Kindt, 2003b).  
Unfortunately, research to date has focused solely on physical checking, which is only 
one modality in which checking behaviour can manifest. To the best of our knowledge, there 
have been no previous investigations of mental checking, a form of checking which according to 
anecdotal reports is both frequent and distressing. Elucidating the potential detrimental effects of 
this mental compulsion could help further refine theory and treatment of checking behaviour. 
Therefore the present study aims to determine the meta-cognitive consequences of repeated 
mental checking. Does mental checking cause memory distrust? Does it have the same effect(s) 
on meta-memory as does physical checking? It was hypothesized that repeated physical checking 
would cause memory distrust (low confidence, but also low vividness and detail) for physical 
checks. Similarly, it was hypothesized that repeated mental checking would cause memory 
distrust (low confidence, but also low vividness and detail) for mental checks. It was unclear 
what effects (if any) would occur across modalities on checking in the opposite modality, so this 
was also examined to see if repeated physical checking would have detrimental effects on meta-
memory for mental checks, and vice versa. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 53 female (85.5%) and 9 male (14.5%) undergraduate students (mean 
age=24.65, SD=5.97; range=18 to 49 years). Results from the BAI, BDI-II, VOCI, and the VOCI 
checking subscale measures (see below for descriptions of these) revealed means for both groups 
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that were all well below clinical norms, confirming that we had recruited a sample which was 
non-clinical in nature (Beck & Steer, 1990; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Thordarson et al., 
2004). 
Measures 
Participants completed a questionnaire package (see measures below) to assess for the 
potential influence of between group differences, in case random assignment did not lead to 
homogenous groups. 
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1990) is a 21-item self-report 
questionnaire that assesses symptoms of anxiety. It has excellent internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.92) and test retest reliability (r = .75) as well as good discriminant and 
convergent validity in a clinical sample (Beck et al., 1988). In a non-clinical sample it has 
excellent internal consistency with a Cronbach’s α of 0.90 and good convergent validity (Osman, 
Kopper, et al., 1997). In a student sample, the BAI exhibited high internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.90) and displayed good discriminant validity, but it had a lower test-retest 
correlation (r = 0.62), and its construct validity when compared to the STAI was only moderate 
(r’s = 0.54 - 0.68; Creamer, Foran, & Bell, 1997). 
The Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1996) is 21-item self-
report measure that assesses symptoms of depression and suicidality. It has excellent internal 
consistency, (Cronbach’s α = 0.91), and high convergent validity, as it correlates strongly with 
the original BDI with an r of 0.93 (Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998). In a student sample, the 
BDI-II exhibited high reliability (α = 0.90) and high convergent and construct validity (Osman, 
Downs, et al., 1997). 
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The Vancouver Obessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson et al., 2004) is a 
55-item self-report questionnaire that measures agreement with symptoms of OCD across a 
broad range of obsessions, behaviours, and personality characteristics known to be associated 
with the disorder using a 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much) point Likert scale. The scale has six 
factors: contamination, checking, obsessions, hoarding, just right, and indecisiveness. The total 
scale and subscales all have good internal consistency, with alpha levels ranging from 0.79 to 
0.98 (Thordarson et al., 2004). The measure also has good convergent and discriminant validity 
(Thordarson, et al., 2004; Radomsky et al., 2006). In a student sample it had excellent test-retest 
reliability (r = 0.91; Radomsky et al., 2006) and good internal consistency (r = 0.96), and it 
correlated highly with another measure of OCD, the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive 
Inventory (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977; r = 0.64) and only moderately with measures of other 
psychopathology, suggesting good convergent/discriminant validity (Thordardson et al., 2004). 
 Meta-Memory and Memory. Participants provided ratings regarding a number of meta-
memory domains (memory confidence, “How would you rate your confidence in your overall 
answers to the previous question [which three knobs did you check on the last trial?]”; memory 
vividness, “How vivid (for example, the clarity and the intensity) was your memory of the 
check?”; and detail, “How detailed (for example, the particular visual features) was your 
memory of the check?”) for the pre- and post-repeated checking trials using a Subjective Units of 
Distress (SUDS)-like 100-point rating scale, where 0 meant ‘not at all’ and 100 meant 
‘extremely’.  
Memory accuracy was recorded as percent correct, and was assessed via participants’ 
answers to the question, “Which three knobs did you check on the last trial?”. 
Procedure 
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Participants were tested individually in a fully functioning laboratory kitchen.  
Training Phase: In order to give participants ‘mental material’ for mental checks (see 
below), they were first taught to physically check the laboratory stove in a standardized ritualized 
manner. This involved participants being asked to turn on, off, and check all six knobs on the 
electric stove (during actual physical and mental trials they were only asked to manipulate three of 
the six knobs at a time; for a full description of this protocol, please see Radomsky et al., 2006).  
Then participants were taught to mentally check the laboratory stove, also in a ritualized 
manner. They were told the following:  
“A mental check involves all of the same elements as a physical check, but instead of 
doing it, a mental action involves imagining yourself doing it. The check occurs only in 
your mind (no pointing and no gesturing). More precisely, I would like you to imagine 
your hand manipulating the knobs, just like you would see yourself doing so in a real 
physical check. Therefore, for each instruction that will be given to you, you will need to 
develop a clear and vivid image for each of the elements involved in your check. 
Subsequently, I will ask you to use your memory from the training and VIVIDLY 
IMAGINE yourself turning on, off, and then checking the stove.”  
During all mental checking practices and trials, participants sat in a chair in the 
laboratory kitchen facing away from the stove and towards the experimenter, in the same 
environment that was used for the physical checks. Participants were asked to close their eyes 
during all mental checks. 
Pre-trials checks: Participants completed one pre-trials physical check and one pre-trials 
mental check of the stove. These two checks were counterbalanced such that half of the 
participants completed a pre-trial physical check first followed by a pre-trial mental check, and 
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half of the participants completed a pre-trial mental check first followed by a pre-trial physical 
check. After each pre-trials check, participants were asked to indicate which knobs were checked 
last and to rate their confidence, vividness, and detail of their memory for the most recent check 
(on a scale of 0-100, see above). 
Repeated checking trials: At this point participants were randomly assigned to the either 
the repeated physical checking condition (RPC) or the repeated mental checking condition 
(RMC). All participants completed 10 checking trials in a row, but for half of the participants 
these trials were physical checks; whereas the remaining half of the participants completed 
repeated trials of mental checks.  
Post-trials checks: Following the repeated checking trials, all participants completed one 
post-trials physical check and one post-trials mental check. Those in the RMC condition 
completed one post-trials mental check first, and then one post-trials physical check, while those 
in the RPC completed one post-trials physical check first, followed by a post-trials mental check. 
Following each post-trials check, participants were asked to indicate which knobs were checked 
last and to rate their confidence, vividness, and detail of their memory for the most recent (post-
trials) check (on a scale of 0-100, see above).  
Finally, all participants completed a questionnaire package consisting of the measures 
listed above.  
Results 
The questionnaire data revealed no significant between-group differences (all p’s >.05). 
Therefore there was no need to consider the questionnaire-based variables as covariates in 
subsequent analyses. Groups also did not differ significantly on the age or sex of participants.  
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Meta-memory: Meta-memory scores pre- and post-checking in RPC and RMC conditions 
are reported in Table 1.  A 2 x 2 repeated measures MANOVA on meta-memory variables 
(memory confidence, vividness, and detail) scores for physical checks revealed a significant 
interaction between group and time, F(1, 58) = 12.47, p < .001, partial η2 = .39, such that those 
who repeatedly physically checked had lower meta-memory for the last physical check than 
those who had repeatedly mentally checked. The reverse was true for a similar MANOVA 
conducted on meta-memory for mental checks, showing a significant interaction between group 
and time, F(1,58) = 12.15, p < .001, partial η2 = .39, such that those who repeatedly mentally 
checked had lower metamemory for the last mental check than those who had repeatedly 
physically checked. Follow-up ANOVAs (controlling for unequal variance where necessary) 
revealed that mean levels of each of memory confidence, vividness, and detail were not 
significantly different between the two groups (i.e., RPC & RMC) pre-repeated checking (all p’s 
> 0.5), but were each significantly different between the groups post-repeated checking (all p’s < 
0.05). These differences between the groups post-repeated checking are explained below. 
Memory confidence for physical checks was significantly lower following RPC 
compared to memory confidence for physical checks post-RMC, t(60) = -6.29, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .40 (see Figure 1a), while memory confidence for mental checks was significantly lower 
following RMC compared to memory confidence for mental checks post-RPC, t(60) = 5.66, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .35 (see Figure 1b). The patterns of findings observed for memory vividness 
and detail were highly similar to those for memory confidence. Memory vividness for physical 
checks was lower post-RPC than it was post-RMC, t(60) = -3.75, p < .001, partial η2 = .19, while 
memory vividness for mental checks post-RMC was significantly lower than memory vividness 
for mental checks following RPC, t(60) = 2.66, p < .05, partial η2 = .11. Memory detail for 
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physical checks was significantly lower post-RPC than was memory detail for physical checks 
post-RMC, t(60) = -2.95, p < .01, partial η2 = .13, while memory detail for mental checks was 
significantly lower post-RMC than was memory detail for mental checks post-RPC, t(60) = 2.29, 
p < .05, partial η2 = .08. 
Memory Accuracy: Memory accuracy means pre- and post-repeated checking are 
displayed in Table 1. A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with memory accuracy for physical 
checks as the dependent variable, and group (i.e., RPC or RMC) as the independent variable, 
calculated over time (pre and post repeated checking) revealed a significant interaction such that 
repeated physical checking impaired memory accuracy for physical checks slightly yet 
significantly, but repeated mental checking did not have any detrimental effects on memory 
accuracy for physical checks, F(1, 60) = 4.45, p = .039, partial η2 = .07 (see Figure 2a). The 
reverse was true for a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA concerning memory accuracy for mental 
checks, revealing a significant interaction such that repeated mental checking slightly but 
significantly impaired memory accuracy for mental checks, but repeated physical checking did 
not negatively affect memory accuracy for mental checks, F(1, 60) = 12.02, p = .001, partial η2 
= .17 (see Figure 2b).   
Discussion 
Consistent with previous research and with our hypotheses, repeated physical checking 
did cause memory distrust (low memory confidence, but also low vividness and detail in 
memory) for physical checks. Repeated mental checking had similar effects. It caused memory 
distrust, including low confidence, vividness, and detail for mental checks. Interestingly, these 
decrements in meta-memory were modality-specific; i.e., repeated physical checking did not 
affect meta-memory for mental checking, and repeated mental checking did not affect meat-
Mental Checking 13
memory for physical checking. This double dissociation is consistent with previous work on 
physical checking (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a; 2003b; 2004, Radomsky et al., 2006) which 
also found that repeated physical checking reduced memory confidence, vividness, and detail for 
physical checks. Our results also support Rachman’s theory (2002) of reduced memory 
confidence contributing to the self-perpetuating mechanism of repeated checking, as repeated 
checking itself caused reduced memory confidence. More importantly, these findings expand on 
previous work by demonstrating that repeated mental checking has the same deleterious effects 
on meta-memory that repeated physical checking has. 
An emerging area of inconsistency however concerns memory accuracy following 
repeated checking. In the current experiment, repeated physical checking caused slight but 
significant decreases in memory accuracy for physical but not for mental checks. Repeated 
mental checking caused slight but significant decreases in memory accuracy for mental but not 
for physical checks. These results do not replicate initial findings that memory accuracy was not 
affected by repeated checking (van de Hout & Kindt, 2003a; 2003b; 2004); however they are 
consistent with later work completed in ecologically valid settings (Ashbaugh & Radomsky, 
2007; Coles et al., 2006; Radomsky et al., 2006). A typical traditional assessment of memory 
accuracy however (e.g., “Which three knobs did you check on the last trial?”) fails to 
accommodate the possible effects of severely reduced memory confidence, vividness and detail 
on memory accuracy. It is entirely possible that those participants who experienced very poor 
meta-memory had the ‘correct’ knobs in mind, but indicated others in their place because of 
extreme doubt. In this case, one would expect that decrements in memory accuracy will be 
mediated by declines in meta-memory variables. This is of course an empirical question, and the 
current study was neither designed nor powered to address it. Future investigations into memory 
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accuracy following repeated checking may well benefit from an exploration of the nature of the 
relationship between memory accuracy and meta-memory. 
Of course the current study contains some limitations worth addressing. First, only one 
type of mental checking was taught to participants (“check in your mind”). Though this is 
consistent with patient reports of a particular manifestation of mental checking it is likely that 
other forms of mental checking behaviour (e.g., remembering a previous check, assessing the 
memory of  a previous check, etc.) could have differential effects on memory and meta-memory 
for the mental check. Another potential problem is that we have no way to verify that the 
participants really did check mentally in the way that was prescribed. It is impossible to know 
what they were doing in their minds, or if all participants were mentally checking in exactly the 
same way. However, though all participants were asked to engage in at least some mental 
checking (at training, pre- and post-trials at the least), results are consistent with hypotheses 
based on participant engagement and compliance with the study protocols. Future experiments 
may benefit from a protocol which perhaps employs a more rigid, and possibly observable form 
of mental checking. Finally, the current study did not have a control condition in which 
participants repeatedly (physically or mentally) checked a sink, for example, as has often been 
employed in previous checking research (e.g., Radomsky et al., 2006). Thus, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that, rather than the mental checking itself causing declines in meta-memory 
variables, it could very well have been a more general effect of thinking or enhanced cognitive 
load. Another potential confound could lie in the domain of demand characteristics. However, 
this is not likely to have influenced our findings, since the second experimental group served as a 
control for this purpose (if demand characteristics were playing a role, we would expect meta-
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memory would have decreased for all modalities, across all conditions, instead of being 
relatively specific).  
Why does repeated checking cause declines in meta-memory? It seems intuitive that the 
more familiar and rote a task becomes, the less effort it requires, and less attention is paid to it. 
van den Hout and Kindt (2004) have proposed that decreases in memory confidence for physical 
checking occur as a function of the decreased encoding of perceptual details as checking recurs, 
since without encoding there can be no elaboration in memory (see Craik & Lockhart, 1972; 
Lockhart & Craik, 1990). Given the results of the current study, a similar process seems likely to 
be responsible for the decreases in memory confidence (and other meta-memory variables) 
following repeated mental checking. The more one reviews the mental check in ones’ mind, the 
fewer details are encoded. Though the ‘details’ to be encoded during mental checking may be 
more visual in nature compared to those in physical checking, we do maintain mental 
representations of touch (Gottfried & Rose, 1980), sound (e.g., Crowder, 1982) and smell (Dade, 
Zatorre, & Jones-Gotman, 2002) to name a few, and these may well feature in mental checking, 
just as they can in physical checking. In addition, previous work on checking (van den Hout & 
Kindt, 2004; Radomsky et al., 2006) found that the more one checks, the more the reliance on 
memory changes from specifically ‘remembering’ to more of a feeling of ‘knowing’. Perhaps the 
same mechanism is at work in mental checking. 
Though the current experiment showed no cross-over effects (that is, RMC did not 
produces memory or meta-memory declines for physical checking and RPC did not produce such 
declines for mental checking), future work in this area may benefit from specific examination of 
the effects of RMC on subsequent urges to physically check (and, by extension, of RPC on 
subsequent urges to mentally check), as it is entirely possible that repeated checking of any type 
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could lead to the amplification of subsequent urges to check across modalities.  Further, 
examinations of the interplay between physical checking, mental checking, visual checking and 
other forms of checking behaviour may well prove to be most valuable in understanding the 
complexity underlying different approaches to verification, particularly in a threat- and/or 
responsibility-related context.  
Recent work on staring (a common component and/or manifestation of visual checking) 
has shown that perseverative staring not only affects retrospective memory, but can also affect 
perception in the moment. Just as perseverative checking causes memory distrust, perseverative 
staring causes perception distrust (van den Hout et al., 2008). Forty undergraduates stared at a 
stove or a light for 10 minutes. Pre- and post-staring they were asked about how certain they 
were about the same object (experimental condition) or the opposite object (control condition). 
In both groups, perseverative staring caused perception uncertainty. The effect was stronger in 
the experimental group, where they stared at the same object they were later asked about (van 
den Hout et al., 2008). A replication of this study using much more clinically realistic staring 
intervals (5 to 300 seconds) found that perceptual distrust can manifest in as little at 7.5 seconds 
of staring (van den Hout et al., 2009). Perseverative checking causes distrust in the memory of 
having checked, just as perseverative staring causes distrust in the image one is seeing (van den 
Hout et al., 2008; 2009).  
Research on reassurance seeking in OCD suggests that it is functionally similar to 
checking behaviour (Parrish & Radomsky, in press). Though early investigations did not show 
that the repeated provision of reassurance led to decreases in memory confidence or increases in 
urges to check or seek additional reassurance (Parrish & Radomsky, 2006), future work in this 
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area may seek to examine the cognitive and meta-cognitive consequences of repeated 
reassurance seeking behaviour.  
The clear implication of this work is that even thoughts about checking can be harmful, 
as they reduce memory confidence and therefore perpetuate the debilitating checking cycle. 
Importantly, clinicians should ask their patients/clients about mental checking, and this 
behaviour should be specifically targeted in CBT interventions through response prevention 
and/or behavioural experiments about the consequences of repeated mental checking. This is 
particularly important as we suspect that the assessment of mental checking in the context of an 
intake interview or early evaluation of someone presenting with OCD concerns is more often 
absent than present. Continued research into the effects of various types of mental checking on 
meta-memory and memory could reveal additional important implications for theory, research 
and treatment of both overt and covert OCD checking behaviour. This may prove to be a useful 
step in increasing our depth of understanding of how repeated checking behaviour begins and 
how it can be stopped or prevented. 
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Mean group scores on memory accuracy (%) and meta-memory (confidence, vividness, and 
detail; 0-100 ratings) for physical and mental checks pre and post repeated checking 
 Physical Checks Mental Checks 
 Pre RC Post RC Pre RC Post RC 
 RMC RPC RMC RPC RMC RPC RMC RPC 
Confidence 84.58 89.52 90.81* 54.87* 81.45 79.90 41.06* 83.81* 
Vividness 73.90 82.65 79.61* 55.39* 76.29 77.55 62.58* 78.26* 
Detail 68.26 77.65 75.84* 54.84* 70.32 71.58 58.39* 73.35* 
Accuracy 96.00 98.90 98.90* 91.29* 95.61 92.32 82.61* 98.90* 
 
Note. Asterisks indicate significant differences (all p’s <.05) between the Repeated Mental 














Figure 1: Average memory confidence ratings (%) for physical and mental checks by group, pre 
and post repeated checking. *p <  .001.  
Figure 2: Average memory accuracy (%) for physical and mental checks by group, pre and post 
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